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The Admissibility of Forensic Reports in the Post-Justice Scalia Supreme Court

Forensic reports linking a defendant to a crime, such as drug tests, blood analysis, DNA profiles and
much more, often constitute the most powerful and persuasive evidence that can be offered at a
criminal trial. Yet the Supreme Court is sharply divided about the constitutionally required foundation
for the admission of such reports. Its opinions on the question “have sown confusion in courts across
the country,” as recently noted by Justice Gorsuch in a dissent to a denial of a Writ of Certiorari. 1 Justice
Gorsuch acknowledged that “the problem appears to be largely of our creation.” 2 In Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 3 an opinion by Justice Scalia, a narrow 5-4 majority held that the analyst who prepared a
drug analysis report must be produced. But in Williams v. Illinois, 4 the plurality opinion held that an
Illinois analyst could refer to the content and apparent accuracy of an out-of-court report prepared by
an analyst in Maryland (who did not testify) without violating the Confrontation Clause. And the
concurring opinion of Justice Thomas, which controlled the outcome in Williams, held that the
Confrontation Clause did not even apply if the forensic report was not certified. Thus the prevailing
confusion in the lower courts is understandable. In his extremely important dissenting opinion, Justice
Gorsuch went on to reveal much of his own thinking about the application of the Sixth Amendment to
forensic reports. His views, which are analyzed in this article, are likely to play a key role in shaping the
future direction of confrontation jurisprudence and determining whether Justice Scalia’s legacy of
forceful support for the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation will survive his departure from the
Court.
The view that only “testimonial” hearsay is within the scope of the Confrontation Clause was first
announced by Justice Scalia in the cases of Crawford v. Washington 5 and Davis v. Washington. 6
Crawford rejected the two-pronged test of Ohio v. Roberts 7 based on “reliability” and “unavailability”
which governed the jurisprudence in this area for the previous 25 years.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that if the hearsay was testimonial it was not
admissible against a criminal defendant, unless the declarant was subject to cross-examination either
prior to trial or at the time the statement was offered. Justice Scalia did not attempt to provide a settled
definition of “testimonial,” but he noted that one possible definition is “statements that were made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.” 8
In Melendez-Diaz the court addressed the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute allowing a
forensic report to be introduced without calling the analyst who prepared it. 9 The case involved a
certificate by an analyst at the state crime lab that the substance seized from defendant was cocaine of
Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S .Ct. 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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a certainty quantity. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, held that
there was “little doubt” that the certified forensic reports fell within the “core class of testimonial
statements” because they were “functionally identical” to in-court testimony. Not only would the
circumstances lead an objective witness to reasonably believe they would be used at trial, that was their
“sole purpose” under Massachusetts law. 10
Justice Kennedy filed a dissent, joined by Justices Alito, Breyer and Roberts, arguing that there was no
need to produce an analyst who prepared a forensic report because they were not “accusatory
witnesses” or “conventional” witnesses. 11 Moreover, because many analysts may be involved in
preparing forensic reports it would be unclear who would need to testify. The dissent also expressed
concern about the logistical difficulties that states would encounter in complying with the requirement.
The dissent noted that the defendant had the right to subpoena the analyst if he wished to challenge
the report. Justice Scalia rejected all of these arguments, saying that the Sixth Amendment drew no
such distinctions between the types of “witnesses” and that the Confrontation Clause placed the burden
of calling the analyst on the State, not the defendant. He also noted that there has been extensive
documentation of “serious deficiencies . . . in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials,” thereby
justifying the need for testing of such reports by cross-examination. 12
The most recent decision concerning the application of the Confrontation Clause to forensic reports is
Williams v. Illinois, 13 a rape prosecution. A vaginal swab from the victim had been sent by the state of
Illinois to Cellmark, a private DNA testing service located in Maryland. Cellmark examined semen found
on the swab and prepared a DNA profile. When the DNA profile was sent back to Illinois, it was run
through the Illinois DNA database where it was found to match the DNA profile of Williams (his DNA had
been collected based upon an earlier unrelated conviction). At trial an analyst from the Illinois crime lab
testified that the Cellmark profile “matched” the profile of Williams in the Illinois database. However,
no one from Cellmark was called to testify that the DNA profile was indeed made from the semen on the
vaginal swab sent by the State of Illinois or that the DNA analysis had been conducted properly. The
Cellmark report itself was not offered into evidence. The state relied instead on the testimony of the
Illinois analyst that there was a match between Williams’s DNA profile and the DNA profile made from
“the semen from the vaginal swabs of the [victim].” Williams argued this was a Confrontation Clause
violation, because the Cellmark DNA profile was being offered for its truth, i.e., that it had been
prepared properly and was accurately derived from the semen on the vaginal swab sent by the state of
Illinois. The testimony of the analyst was in effect bringing the out-of-court report into evidence.
The Supreme Court split sharply in deciding the case. A four-person plurality opinion, written by Justice
Alito and joined by Justices Kennedy, Roberts and Breyer, held that the Cellmark report was not being
offered for its truth and was therefore not “testimonial.” As an alternate ground for affirmance, the
plurality relied on the fact that the report was not prepared for the primary purpose of “accusing” a
“known suspect” or a “targeted” individual. A dissent written by Justice Kagan, and joined by Justices
Sotomayor, Ginsburg and Scalia, found a confrontation violation on the ground that the Cellmark report
was being offered for its truth and was testimonial. The dissent noted that Williams’s attorney could
557 U.S. at 310-11.
Id. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
12
Id. at 318-22.
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not ask questions about the Cellmark analyst’s “proficiency, the care he took in performing his work, or
his veracity.” He could not probe whether “the analyst had tested the wrong vial, inverted the labels on
the sample, committed some more technical error, or simply made up the results.” 14
Justice Thomas concurred with the decision to affirm, but strongly rejected all the grounds of the
plurality opinion. 15 He agreed with the dissent that the Cellmark report was being offered for its truth
and also rejected the alternate ground of the plurality opinion. However, he found the Cellmark report
was not “testimonial” because it lacked sufficient “formality”—the report was prepared by a private
laboratory and was not certified. Based on this 4-4-1 split, the decision was affirmed.
An example of the confusion created by Williams is Stuart v Alabama, 16 a case in which the Supreme
Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari. Stuart was prosecuted for driving under the
influence. To prove its case the State introduced the results of a blood-alcohol test conducted hours
after her arrest, but failed to produce the analyst who conducted the test. Instead the State called a
different analyst who used the results of the test and the rate at which alcohol is metabolized to give an
estimate for the jury of Stuart’s alcohol level hours earlier when she was driving. The State argued that
there was no confrontation violation because the report was not being offered for the truth of what it
said about Stuart’s blood-alcohol at the time of the test, only to provide a basis for the State’s expert to
estimate Stuart’s blood-alcohol level when she was driving. Stuart was convicted and her conviction
was affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Sotomayor,
dissented from the Court’s denial of her Writ of Certiorari and expressed his strong view that Stuart’s
confrontation right was denied.
First, Justice Gorsuch observed that “forensic evidence plays a decisive role in criminal trials today” and
noted that it is not “immune from the risk of manipulation.” 17 He further stated that “to guard against
such mischief and mistake and the risk of false convictions they invite, our criminal justice system
depends on adversarial testing and cross-examination. 18 Thus it appears that he would vote to reaffirm
the holding of Melendez-Diaz.
Second, Justice Gorsuch emphatically rejected the argument made by the State of Alabama in the Stuart
case that the earlier report measuring Stuart’s blood alcohol was not being offered for its truth. He said
“After all, why would any prosecutor bother to offer in evidence the nontestifying analyst’s report in this
case except to prove the truth of its assertions about the level of alcohol in Ms. Stuart’s blood at the
time of the test? The whole point of the exercise was to establish—because of the report’s truth—a
basis for the jury to credit the testifying expert’s estimation of Ms. Stuart’s blood-alcohol level hours
earlier.” 19 His analysis indicates that he would reject the plurality’s conclusion in Williams that an out-ofcourt DNA profile was not being offered for its truth when it was claimed by a testifying analyst to be a
“match” with Williams’s DNA.

Id. at 124-125 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 103 (Thomas, J. concurring).
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Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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Id. at 37.
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Third, he rejects Justice Thomas’s view that the Confrontation Clause applies only to certified
documents, because there was no indication in Stuart that the report had been certified. Justice
Thomas’s view, which was the basis of his concurrence in Williams, was rejected by the other eight
justices. As Justice Kagan said in her dissent, applying the Confrontation Clause only to a certified
forensic report would allow the prosecution easily to avoid the demands of the Confrontation Clause
“by using the right kind of forms with right kind of language . . . principally, never call anything a
“certificate.” 20
It is possible that Justice Gorsuch could support the result in Williams by accepting the alternate ground
of the plurality opinion, which was that a forensic report qualifies as testimonial only when it is
“prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual” who is “in custody [or] under
suspicion.” 21 In Williams the Cellmark DNA analysis was performed at a time when there was no known
suspect, whereas in Stuart the defendant was already under arrest for driving under the influence. In his
dissent in Stuart, Justice Gorsuch took notice of this alternate ground but did not take a position on it. 22
Nonetheless it seems unlikely he would endorse it for several reasons.
First, the Court itself has never previously held or even suggested that the Confrontation Clause applies
only to “accusatory” statements made against “targeted” individuals. As Justice Kagan stated in her
dissent “[w]here that test comes from is anybody’s guess.” 23 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas
commented that a requirement that the statement must be made against a targeted individual “lacks
any grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in logic.” 24 He noted that ex parte examinations of
witnesses in 16th century England often occurred “before the accused’s identity was known.” 25 With
respect to the suggestion that the statement must be “accusatory,” he commented that “a statement
that is not facially inculpatory may turn out to be highly probative of a defendant’s guilt when
considered with other evidence.” 26
Second, confining the Confrontation Clause to cases where there are “known suspects” addresses only
one of concerns about forensic reports—a possible motive to fabricate by the analyst. But as Justice
Kagan said in her dissent: “[S]urely the typical problem with laboratory analyses—and the typical focus
of cross-examination—has to do with careless or incompetent work, rather than with personal
vendettas. And as to that predominant concern, it makes not a whit of difference whether, at the time
of the laboratory test, the police already have a suspect.” 27 Justice Gorsuch appears to agree. In his
dissent in Stuart, he indicated his awareness that cross-examination is needed to address more than
motivational concerns about the analyst. He said “[e]ven the most well-meaning analyst may lack
essential training, contaminate a sample, or err during the testing process,” and that “to guard
against such mischief and mistake and the risk of false convictions they invite, our criminal justice
system depends on adversarial testing and cross-examination.” 28
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 140 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 83.
22
Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 37 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
23
567 U.S. at 135 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
24
Id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).
25
Id. at 115.
26
Id. at 116.
27
Id. at 135-136 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
28
Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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Finally, this exceedingly constricted interpretation of the confrontation right is being advocated by
the same Justices who opposed the holding of Melendez-Diaz, and Justice Gorsuch has indicated he
supports that decision. Moreover, there is no indication that the Justices who joined the plurality
opinion would limit the “targeted” individual requirement to forensic reports, because the opinion
suggests that having an identified suspect was a partial basis of decision in cases such as Crawford
and Hammon v. Indiana 29 that did not involve a forensic report. Both of these cases involved
hearsay statements by a wife incriminating her husband for assaultive behavior. However, there is
no indication in either of those decisions that the confrontation violation would have been
eliminated if the declarants had directed their incriminating statements against a stranger rather
than against a known suspect, and that would be an absurd outcome as a matter of policy.

If the “targeted” individual requirement were extended beyond forensic reports to other types of
hearsay statements it would amount to one of the most extreme retrenchments of confrontation
protections ever proposed. Often the most damaging and untrustworthy hearsay statements are made
prior to the time the defendant becomes a suspect. Statements made that cause someone to become a
suspect can often be more incriminating than statements made after they have been arrested. Eye
witness descriptions of the alleged perpetrator, his clothing, the car he was driving, the manner in which
the crime was committed, and other circumstances are usually obtained before a suspect is identified or
apprehended. Participants in a crime often attempt to implicate others and turn them into suspects in
order to obtain leniency for themselves. The dangers of wrongful conviction would rise exponentially if
hearsay statements given prior to the identification of a suspect could be introduced at a criminal trial
without any constitutional requirement that the declarant be confronted and cross examined. For these
reasons, it seems highly doubtful that Justice Gorsuch would join the alternate ground of the plurality
opinion in Williams.

Apart from Melendez-Diaz and Williams, there is one other case involving forensic reports that has
sharply divided the Court—Bullcoming v. New Mexico. 30 It addressed the question of who must be
called by the government to be cross examined about the report. Bullcoming was charged for driving
while intoxicated, and the State offered a blood test report indicating a blood-alcohol level well above
the legal threshold. The analyst who took and analyzed the samples did not appear at trial, and the
record showed only that he had been placed on unpaid leave for undisclosed reasons. The prosecutor
instead called another analyst from the same lab to answer questions about the process of conducting
such alcohol tests, but the analyst was not involved in conducting defendant’s test. The court, again in a
5-4 decision, held that the presence of the second analyst was not sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause because such “surrogate testimony” could not convey what the analyst who actually conducted
the test “knew or observed about the events his certification concerned.” 31 Moreover, such surrogate
testimony would not expose “any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s part.” 32 Therefore, admission
of the report violated defendant’s confrontation rights.
Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Stuart also reveals his views about this issue, even though he
did not comment on it directly. At Stuart’s trial, the State had called a Dr. Hudson, who was the section

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S.647 (2011)
31
Id. at 661.
32
Id. at 662.
29
30
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chief of the toxicology laboratory, rather than calling the analyst who prepared the blood-alcohol test. 33
Dr. Hudson testified about the policies and procedures of the toxicology laboratory, including “controls
in the analysis and laboratory’s standard practice of having the results of the analysis independently
reviewed.” 34 He stated that he was “responsible for the day-to-day workflow in the laboratory, testing
assignments for cases, as well as personnel management.” 35 The Alabama Court concluded that “t]his
testimony provided [Stuart] with ample opportunity to cross examine [Dr. Hudson] regarding the
[blood]-analysis report.” 36 However, there was no indication that Dr. Hudson had any personal
knowledge or involvement with the report relating to Stuart. Presumably for this reason, Justice
Gorsuch clearly rejected this holding of the Alabama court and instead concluded that “[t]he engine of
cross-examination was left unengaged, and the Sixth Amendment was violated.” 37
Based on the analysis above, it appears that Justice Gorsuch would support the result in Melendez-Diaz
and Bullcoming and agree with the dissent in Williams, just as Justice Scalia did. It remains to be seen
what position Justice Kavanaugh will take on these questions. But even if Justice Kavanaugh follows the
voting pattern of Justice Kennedy, the justice he replaced, it would not change the outcome of these
cases, unless one of the other Justices has a change of heart or a new Justice is appointed.
Perhaps the greatest significance of Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Stuart is his statement that “[W]e owe
lower courts struggling to abide our holdings more clarity than we have afforded them in this area.” 38
He clearly is urging his colleagues to revisit Williams, and he apparently intends to do what he can to
clarify the law governing the admissibility of forensic reports. In doing so, he will be entering a fierce
ideological battlefield. Some of his colleagues appear ready to dismantle the Crawford framework itself
that was built under the leadership of Justice Scalia. In Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Bullcoming, joined
by Justices Alito, Roberts, and Breyer, he stated ominously that “it bears remembering that the
Crawford approach was not preordained.” 39 He declared that “[t]his Court’s missteps have produced an
interpretation of the word ‘witness’ at odds with its meaning elsewhere in the Constitution, including
elsewhere in the Sixth Amendment, and at odds with the sound administration of justice.” 40 He stated
that “[i]t is time to return to solid ground.” 41 In Williams, the same four Justices sought to constrict the
scope of Crawford by interpreting “testimonial” so narrowly that it would leave major areas of hearsay
untouched by limiting it to “accusatory” statements made against a targeted individual or “known
suspect.” 42 This effort by Justice Alito, who wrote the plurality opinion, to so drastically narrow the
Confrontation Clause prompted Justice Kagan to say acidly in her dissent that “I call Justice Alito’s
opinion ‘the plurality,’ because that is the conventional term for it. But in all except its disposition, his
(unpublished opinion at 8(a)) APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36 (2018)
(No. 17-1676) (providing the unpublished opinion of the Ala. Ct. of Crim. App.), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171676/50133/20180614111043947_36461%20pdf%20Heldman%20app.pdf.
34
Id. (unpublished opinion at 13(a)).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
38
Id. at 37.
39
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 684 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
40
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opinion is a dissent: Five Justices specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of
its explication.” 43
As Justice Gorsuch enters this battlefield, it might be useful for him to remind his colleagues of the view
of confrontation rights conveyed by the Court’s promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence under its
rule making power in 1973. The rule dealing with public records was specifically drafted to avoid a
collision with the Confrontation Clause. As approved and submitted by the Supreme Court and
ultimately adopted by Congress, FRE 803(8) creates a hearsay exception for “a record or statement of a
public office if it sets out in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings
from a legally authorized investigation.” The clear negative implication of this exception is that “factual
findings from a legally authorized investigation” are not admissible against a criminal defendant. The
Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying the proposed rule, and submitted to Congress as explanatory
text, made this clear by stating that such reports “are admissible only in civil cases and against the
government in criminal cases in view of the almost certain collision with confrontation rights which
would result from their use against the accused in a criminal case.” 44 (emphasis added) This view
expressed in the Advisory Committee’s Note to the Court’s own rule supports the majority position in
both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming and the dissent’s view in Williams. 45
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Sotomayor are to be applauded for their effort to have the Court address
the chaos left by the Williams decision. It is unclear what support they will receive from the other
members of the Court. Justice Kavanaugh is the successor to Justice Kennedy and his former law clerk,
and Justice Kennedy was the primary ideological adversary of Justice Scalia on the admissibility of
forensic reports. At the same time, Justice Kavanaugh is generally viewed as an “originalist” in the
Justice Scalia tradition. 46 The Crawford opinion is not only a paradigm example of Justice Scalia’s
originalism, but according to one source he described it as his favorite case. 47 Justice Thomas is certain
to adhere to his position that formality is the decisive factor defining the scope of confrontation rights,
because he has asserted that view in confrontation cases even preceding Crawford. 48 On the other
hand, Justice Breyer seems open to new approaches. He requested reargument in Williams, and
indicated his dissatisfaction with both the plurality and dissenting opinions. 49 His concern about the
administrative burden on states of producing an analyst may be mitigated somewhat by evidence of
successful adaptation by states to this requirement in the years since Melendez-Diaz. But he clearly

Id. at 120 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Advisory Committee’s Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(iii).
45
Forensic reports can be admitted under certain other exceptions, particularly FRE 803(5), the exception for past
recollection recorded, because if the analyst testifies the confrontation concern is eliminated. Lower courts have
also recognized a “ministerial” exception to FRE 803(8) allowing routine, nonadversarial reports, such as one
related to the calibration of a testing device, to be admitted. See generally Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, 4 Federal Evidence 8:91 (4th ed. 2013)
46
“For both liberals and conservatives, a central fact about judge Brett Kavanaugh is that he is an ‘originalist.’”
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/09/kanavaugh-originalist-why-you-shouldnt-care-219344.
47
Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court 317 (2007) (“Asked at a public forum his
favorite of his opinions—a common question for justices in such settings—he came up with an esoteric case
interpreting the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment”; presumably that case was Crawford).
48
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)
49
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 86 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“neither the plurality nor the dissent answers
adequately” the question presented).
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seeks greater consensus from his colleagues about who it is that the government must produce to be
cross-examined and whether any single witness will be adequate. 50
The unfortunate impact of the Williams decision is that it leaves the state of the law in cases involving
similar facts controlled by Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which extends confrontation rights only
to forensic reports that are sworn or certified--a requirement which the eight other Justices reject. This
requirement was disputed by the historical analysis in Crawford, where the Court stated: “We find it
implausible that a provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial
by unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.” 51 As the dissent points out, the certification requirement
makes the right to confrontation “easily erasable” and “turn[s] the Confrontation Clause upside down”
by making presumably less reliable uncertified reports exempt from confrontation, thereby diminishing
a defendant’s rights “in the very cases in which the accused should ‘enjoy the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.’” 52 Hopefully Justice Gorsuch will be successful in persuading his
colleagues to provide more coherent guidance to lower courts about when an analyst from the forensic
laboratory must be produced for cross-examination and who that representative should be.

Id. at 90. Justice Breyer’s reluctance to require anyone from a crime lab to testify in support of a forensic report
is somewhat surprising, since he is from Massachusetts where there have been some of the most sensational and
widely-publicized crime lab scandals resulting in dismissal of thousands of convictions. See
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/12/28/massachusetts-prosecutors-to-throw-out8000-convictions-in-second-drug-lab-scandal/?utm_term=.ce828668bd7b
51
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52-53, n. 3 (2004).
52
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 140 (2012) (Kagan, J. dissenting). As Justice Kagan said in frustration elsewhere in
her dissent, “what a way to run a criminal justice system.” Id. at 133.
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